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Lilly v. Virginia: A Chance
To Reconceptualize The
Confrontation Right
by Richard D. Friedman
University of Michigan Law School
In Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court once again
has the opportunity to grapple with the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmel).t. The
basic facts of Lilly are simple, for they present the ageold problem of accomplice confessions. Three men,
Gary Barker and Ben and Mark Lilly, went on a crime
spree, during which one of them shot to death a young
man they had robbed and kidnaped. Ben Lilly was
charged with being the triggerman, and Barker
testified to that effect at Ben's trial. Mark did not
testify. But Mark had made a statement to the police
shortly after the trio was apprehended, and he also
identified his brother Ben as the triggerman. Mark's
statement was introduced over Ben's objection. Ben
was convicted. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the conviction, treating Mark's statement as a
declaration against penal interest, 499 S.E.2d 522
(1998), and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The case was argued on March 29, 1999.
If the Court decides to treat the case within the
framework it has attempted to set up for
Confrontation cases, it would ask whether Mark's
statement fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
(It seems fairly clear that Mark has been treated as
being unavailable; whether either party could have
induced him to testify raises interesting questions that
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the Court will probably not touch.) There seems to be
little doubt that the hearsay exception for declarations
against interest is firmly rooted, and the Virginia
courts did bring the statement within their version of
the exception. Moreover, by virtue of the broad
adoption of codifications based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, most American jurisdictions now treat
declarations against penal interest as within the
exception. But, as Lilly argues, most American
jurisdictions refuse to use this line of reasoning to
admit accomplice confessions. Indeed, in Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), in a relatively
narrow reading of the exception for declarations
against penal interest, refused to apply the exception
to nonself-inculpatory statements, even if they are
made within broader narrative that is generally
self-inculpatory; it would not be surprising if the Court
constitutionalizes that rule, and holds that Mark's
statement identifying Ben as the triggerman was not
against interest. But a sound framework for such a
decision is difficult to articulate: Are the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Federal Rules now to be
the determinant of what is "firmly rooted," and so of
what the Confrontation Clause will tolerate? Or, by
contrast, should a state be allowed to satisfy the
Clause simply by putting a plausible tag of some well
recognized exception on a statement? Alternatively,
the Court could follow the bare majority in Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and hold that simply
treating the statement as a declaration against penal
interest "defines too large a class for meaningf\tl
Confrontation Clause analysis". But if the statement
should be treated in terms of a subcategory, "as
involving a confession by an accomplice which
incriminates a criminal defendant," then what
becomes of the idea that falling within a firmly rooted
hearsay ex..;eption is er1ough to take a statement out of
the Confrontation bar?
In my view, the problem is that the Court has
defined the confrontation right in terms of, and so
made it dependent upon, ordinary hearsay law. The
Court should attempt to define the right in terms
independent of hearsay law. In an amicus brief filed
on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union (and
available through www.aclu.org), Margaret Berger and
I have offered some approaches by which this could be
done. The brief got some apparently favorable
attention at oral argument, both from the bench and
from Lilly's counsel. We will soon see whether the
Court is yet willing to acknowledge that its
Confrontation Clause decisions, by confounding a
fundamental right that reached full flower in the
Anglo-American legal system with the bog of hearsay
law, have given little guidance to lower courts or
protection to defendants, and have retarded the
liberalization of hearsay law in civil cases and other
situations where the confrontation right is not at
stake.
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